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Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court striking the imposing of certain adult
sentences on juveniles suggest a shift in the Court‟s traditional Eighth Amendment analysis of
sentencing practices involving juveniles in the criminal justice system. Relying on settled
research outlining the developmental differences between children and adults, the Court has
modified its longstanding Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from one that hinged primarily on the
nature of the sentence to a doctrinal approach that places greater emphasis on the age and
characteristics of the offender upon whom the sentence is imposed. As the Court increasingly
relies upon the principle that youth are different to inform its decisions involving children‟s
constitutional rights, we suggest that the sentencing of juveniles as adults, as well as the
conditions under which juvenile offenders are incarcerated, will face greater scrutiny. While
adult crime may indeed warrant adult time, the punishment of juvenile crime—whether in the
juvenile or adult justice systems—must yield to a different set of constitutional principles. In the
Article that follows, we propose a distinct juvenile definition of cruel and unusual punishment that
will produce divergent outcomes depending upon whether the litigant challenging the sentence or
other aspects of his punishment is a juvenile or an adult.
We start with a historical overview of the American juvenile justice system, showing how the
system has been transformed over time by both internal and external influences, and how the
current wave of constitutional reform fits within that historical context. We then summarize the
developmental and neuroscientific research establishing that youth are different in
constitutionally relevant ways, to underscore how these differences and the underlying research
are driving contemporary constitutional analysis. This review is followed by a discussion of
Supreme Court case law involving challenges to sentencing practices and conditions of
confinement under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, we summarize applicable international and
human rights principles, as the Supreme Court has increasingly demonstrated its willingness to
consider international law to inform its own independent judgment regarding the country‟s
evolving, contemporary moral standards.
INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BACKWARDS, LOOKING FORWARD
Over 100 years ago, the first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois. 1
The original purpose of the court was to separate juvenile offenders from adult offenders, to
provide opportunities for rehabilitation and treatment, to create a more informal setting in which
to adjudicate criminal conduct by children, and to limit the consequences of engaging in such
1

The Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. See also DEAN JOHN CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 13 (5th ed. 1992). Although the first Juvenile Court Act
was passed in Illinois, many commentators credit Judge Ben Lindsey of the Denver Juvenile Court for his visionary
approach to juvenile justice and for having the greatest influence on the development of the early juvenile court in this
country. See H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE, POLICIES, PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS 1-1 (2003).
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conduct.2 Within twenty-five years, almost every state in the country had established a juvenile
justice system.3 The basic premise of the juvenile court—that youth are different from adults, and
uniquely capable of rehabilitation—would eventually be echoed in the Court‘s current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, though now supported by contemporary behavioral and
neuroscientific research in adolescent development, and with more robust procedural protections.
The early juvenile justice system left procedural due process behind, favoring
informality over process and the best interests of the children over consideration for their rights. 4
Prior to 1966, the nation‘s juvenile courts functioned with little scrutiny from outsiders—either by
members of the public or even appellate courts.5 Except for two instances in which the Supreme
Court acknowledged the particular vulnerability of youth with respect to police interrogations and
confessions,6 juvenile courts for the most part operated far outside constitutional boundaries.
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Kent v United States.7 Kent involved a challenge to
transfer proceedings under the District of Columbia‘s Juvenile Court Act. For the first time in
juvenile court history, the Court held that certain due process protections were required before a
child could be removed from juvenile court jurisdiction to adult criminal court.8 The Kent Court
recognized the substantial consequences of criminal court prosecution for a juvenile, from
significantly enhanced sentencing to other collateral consequences with potentially lasting
impact.9

2
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 5–8 (2005); see also Catherine J. Ross, Disposition
In A Discretionary Regime: Punishment And Rehabilitation In The Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038
(1995) (explaining how discretion preserved flexibility in juvenile justice jurisprudence).
3

Juvenile Justice History, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.cjcj.org/juvenile/

justice/juvenile/justice/history/0 (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). ―In 1899, the first juvenile court was finally established in
Cook County, Illinois, and by 1925, all but two states had followed.‖ Id. See also HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86 (1999), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/chapter4.pdf (explaining that by 1925, all but two states had established
a juvenile court).
4

Ross, supra note 2, at 1039.

5

Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9–31 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
[hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL].
6

Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding that the confession obtained from a fourteen-year-old
boy, who had been held for five days without seeing his parents, a lawyer, or any other adult friend, was obtained in
violation of due process); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding that a murder confession by a fifteen-year-old boy
after five hours of interrogation, starting at midnight, by police officers working in relays without advising him of his
rights, and without the advice of friends, family or counsel, should have been excluded as involuntary in violation of due
process). In Gallegos, the Court observed that an adolescent ―cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his
senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. . . . Without some adult protection against this
inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.‖ Gallegos,
370 U.S. at 54. The Court also explained, ―Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts
of life which contradict them.‖ Haley, 332 U.S. at 601.
7

383 U.S. 541 (1966).

Id. at 561–62 (―[A]n opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to
entry of a waiver order. . . . [T]he hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.‖).
8

9

Id. at 550 (recounting that the juvenile defendant in Kent was originally sentenced to thirty to ninety years

in prison).
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Kent ushered in a period of profound change for the juvenile justice system. 10 One year
after Kent, the Court decided In re Gault,11 a landmark decision setting forth the Court‘s broadest
statement at that time about the need to protect children‘s constitutional rights. Eschewing labels
of civil versus criminal and rejecting the elevation of form over process, the Court was
unequivocal in its view that courts which possess the power to strip children of their liberty,
however benevolently intentioned, must operate within the mandates of the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Gault was quickly followed by decisions requiring the state to
prove delinquency charges against a juvenile on proof beyond a reasonable doubt 13 and extending
the protections of the double jeopardy clause to juveniles.14 Although the Court declined to
extend the right to jury trial to juveniles in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,15 a case decided in 1971,
the inexorable march toward a more constitutional juvenile court system was underway.16
Throughout the next few years, every state amended its juvenile court act to ensure full
compliance with the Court‘s constitutional mandates. 17
This constitutionalization of the juvenile court was the dominant story in juvenile justice
until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when increases in violent juvenile crime caused by the lethal
combination of crack cocaine and guns18 spread throughout the country. 19 The prominence

10
Ross, supra note 2, at 1039 (―Beginning in 1966, the Supreme Court attempted to define a balance
between the promise of the rehabilitative ideal, which appeared to demand and justify judicial discretion, and the claim for
sufficient procedural protections under the Constitution to ensure fundamental fairness.‖).
11

387 U.S. 1 (1967).

12

Id. at 27–29.

13

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).

14

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).

15

403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).

16

Ross, supra note 2, at 1040–41.

The juvenile courts that have resulted in most states are hybrids that reflect the series of
compromises underlying their unique structure. They exist in a twilight, neither wholly bound by
the constitutional norms of criminal procedure nor convincingly ‗civil‘ and rehabilitative as
envisioned by their founders. The post-Gault juvenile court is characterized by unresolved conflicts
between the urge to allow judicial discretion where it serves the purposes of rehabilitation and
demands for procedural protections; between the rehabilitative goal and societal demands for
retribution; and between idealistic hopes and realistic disappointments.
Id.
17

See, e.g., The Juvenile Act, 42 PA CONST. STAT. §§ 6301–6365 (2008), available at http://www.pajuv

defenders.org/file/Juvenile_Act_2008.pdf.
18

ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, YOUTH, GUNS, AND VIOLENT CRIME 39, available at http://futureofchildren.org

/futureofchildren/publications/docs/12_02_03.pdf.
The increase in violence in the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s was due
primarily to an increase in violent acts committed by people under age 20. Similarly, dramatic
declines in homicide and robbery in recent years are attributable primarily to a decline in youth
violence.
The increase in youth homicide was predominantly due to a significant increase in the use of
handguns, which converted ordinary teenage fights and other violent encounters into homicides.
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accorded to images and stories about violent juvenile offenders sparked a new wave of juvenile
justice ―reform,‖ one aimed at limiting the jurisdiction of juvenile court and expanding the
jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system over young offenders. Convinced that the country
was headed toward a generation of increasingly violent teens,20 legislators quickly enacted laws
that sought to ensure that youth charged with the most serious offenses would be prosecuted as
adults.21 As yet another period of transformation swept over the juvenile court, concerns for due
process and the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders were almost completely eclipsed by
concerns for public safety, incapacitation and retribution—the latter being core attributes of the
adult criminal justice system.22 Whatever lingering fealty to principles of rehabilitation and
treatment the juvenile court retained was now reserved for an increasingly dwindling number of
juveniles charged with crimes.23 At the same time, youthful offenders in the criminal justice
Several other interrelated factors also fueled the rise in youth violence, including the rise of illegal
drug markets, particularly for crack cocaine, the recruitment of youth into those markets, and an
increase in gun carrying among young people.
Id.
19

Id.

John Dilulio is largely credited with creating the ―super-predator‖ myth. Elizabeth Becker, As ExTheorist on Young „Superpredators,‟ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/
20

2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
Based on all that we have witnessed, researched and heard from people who are close to the action, .
. . here is what we believe: America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile ‗super-predators‘ –
radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who
murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs and create serious
communal disorders.
Dilulio subsequently retracted this ‗belief.‘ Id. See also WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY
HOW TO WIN AMERICA‘S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996); Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the
Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the Preadolescent‟s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (2000)
(arguing that rejections to the infancy defense are unfounded and unsupported by empirical data).
AND

21

YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 5, at 13–14; see also PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME xi (1996),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf (reporting on the five major changes in the way that serious and
violent juvenile offenders are being handled in the criminal justice system).
22

Graham v Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010).

23

See Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened To The Right To Treatment?: The Modern
Quest For A Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1794 (1995).
While some of the most egregious abuses described in the pleadings and opinions of the 1970s have
abated, many training schools remain ill-equipped to provide children living in them with the
education, behavior modification, counseling, substance abuse treatment, and the mental and
physical health care they need. The laws of most states still promise such care. In recent years,
however, a wave of legislation increasing the severity with which children who break the law are
treated has compromised that promise. Legislatures have introduced punishment into juvenile
codes, authorized mandatory minimum commitments in the juvenile justice system, and expanded
the possibilities for prosecuting children in criminal courts. Some juvenile courts now have the
power to impose a criminal sentence as part of a juvenile disposition, with the criminal sentence
stayed—either temporarily or permanently—depending upon the youth‘s performance during the
course of the juvenile disposition.
Id.
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system bore the full brunt of adult punishment, receiving not only lengthy term of years
sentences, but sentences of life without parole and even death. 24
As a result of this adultification of juvenile offending in the public discourse and,
increasingly, in state legislation, researchers associated with the MacArthur Foundation‘s
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice began conducting studies and
compiling research that demonstrated striking and highly relevant differences between children
and adolescents on the one hand, and adults on the other.25 In particular, this research highlighted
key traits among juveniles that illustrated their reduced blameworthiness for their criminal
conduct.26 Specifically, researchers focused on three distinct qualities of adolescence—
immaturity of judgment, susceptibility to negative peer pressure, and a capacity for change and
rehabilitation based on the inherently transient nature of adolescence. 27 In 2005, this research
took center stage before the United States Supreme Court when it was asked to review the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.28
Importantly, the notion that certain offenders might be less blameworthy for their
criminal conduct had already found traction with the Court in 2003, when the Court reconsidered
its prior caselaw upholding the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. In Atkins v.
Virginia,29 the Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh30 and held that mentally retarded defendants
were categorically less blameworthy for their criminal conduct, including murder, than
unimpaired adult offenders.31 They were thus ineligible for the death penalty. 32 Roper followed
Atkins‘ blueprint in persuading the Court that all juveniles under the age of eighteen were likewise
categorically less blameworthy than adults, and could not receive the most serious sentence
At the time of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the
Court struck the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, seventy-two children were being held on death row
in the United States. Also, nineteen states allowed executions of people under age eighteen: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Texas and Virginia. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
24

25
The MacArthur Foundation formally convened the Research Network in 1995. YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra
note 5, at 3–4. The Foundation saw a need for ―a scientific initiative that would address the implications of adolescent
development for the construction of rational juvenile justice policy and law.‖ Id. at 4. Led by distinguished Temple
University Psychology Professor Laurence Steinberg, the Research Network brought a developmental lens to issues such
as competence to stand trial, culpability, and the impact of different interventions. Id. at 4–5.
26

See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 5.

See generally Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles‟ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents
and Adults‟ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003) (studying whether youths can pass the
standard competency tests used in the criminal justice system); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of
Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996)
(analyzing research to explore what constitutes psychosocial maturity); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty
by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence] (explaining
that the lack of psychosocial maturity in juveniles makes them especially vulnerable to coercion and outside influences);
Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995)
(explaining factors linked to teenage development that may affect decision making capabilities in adolescents).
27

28

543 U.S. 551 (2005).

29

536 U.S. 304 (2002).

30

492 U.S. 302 (1989).

31

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20.

32

Id. at 321.
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available—a sentence of death reserved for the worst of the worst criminals. 33 The Court
embraced the developmental research articulating the differences between juvenile and adult
offenders,34 and reversed its prior 1989 decision in Stanford v Kentucky35 which had left the death
penalty in place for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders.36
Five years later, the Court was presented with another opportunity to consider the
constitutional relevance of juvenile developmental traits in Graham v. Florida,37 where petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense. The Graham court echoed Roper in its reliance on developmental research as
well as emerging neuroscientific research to ban the imposition of this adult sentence on juvenile
offenders as violative of the Eighth Amendment. The Court reiterated its findings about the
developmental characteristics of youth cited in Roper in support of its decision. 38 One year later,
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,39 the Court extended the application of this research beyond
sentencing cases, citing it once again to hold that a juvenile‘s age is a relevant factor in the
Miranda custody analysis.40 In a span of just six years, the Court handed down three decisions
33

Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70.

34

Id. at 569–70. See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) (describing and
defining the notion of an identity crisis within the context of youth identities); Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) (explaining the underlying factors
behind reckless behavior in adolescents); Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1013
(exploring the research and theories behind concerns raised by the criminal culpability of children).
35

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

36

Id. One year prior to Stanford, the Court handed down Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818–38
(1988), in which a plurality (including Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) determined
that ―standards of decency‖ did not permit the execution of an individual who commits a crime while under the age of
sixteen. Id. at 830.
37

130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).

Id. at 2026 (―No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper about the
nature of juveniles.‖).
38

39
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). In J.D.B. v North Carolina, the Court had the opportunity to review its concerns
underlying its decision in Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in the context of the interrogation of a thirteen-yearold middle school student who was questioned in a closed-door school conference room by members of law enforcement
and school administrators. Id. at 2399. In J.D.B., the Supreme Court ruled that a child‘s age was relevant to determining
when a suspect has been taken into custody and is consequently entitled to a Miranda warning. Id. at 2046. Writing for
the majority, Justice Sotomayor stated, ―so long as the child‘s age was known to the officer at the time of police
questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is
consistent with the objective nature of that test.‖ Id. Justice Sotomayor effectively characterized youth as an
unambiguous fact that ―generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception,‖ id. at 2403, and said that
such ―conclusions‖ are ―self-evident to anyone who was once a child himself, including any police officer or judge.‖ Id.

Id. at 2406. Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966), is the Supreme Court‘s seminal decision
adopting a set of prophylactic warnings to be given to suspects prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement.
Specifically, the Miranda Court instructed that, prior to questioning, a suspect ―must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.‖ Id. The Miranda warnings were adopted to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the ―inherently compelling pressures‖ of questioning by the police.
Id. at 467. While any police interview has ―coercive aspects to it,‖ Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam), interviews which take place in police custody have a ―heighte[ned] risk‘ that statements are not the product of the
suspect‘s free choice.‖ J.D.B. v North Carolina, 131 S. Ct 2394, 2401 (2011) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 435 (2000)). Miranda expressly recognized that custodial interrogation in an ―unfamiliar . . . police dominated
40
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that have re-shaped our thinking about the rights of juvenile offenders under the Constitution. 41
At the same time, the Court‘s decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. are juxtaposed
with a largely contrary legislative mood that has persisted in treating juvenile offenders like
adults.42 Just as legislatures nationwide were embracing the now debunked premise that juvenile
crime was synonymous with adult crime and should be punished accordingly, 43 the Supreme
Court placed its own constitutional breaks on this trend. In Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the Court
made an abrupt turn, forcing a reexamination of juvenile and criminal justice policy and practices.
Through these cases, the Court has articulated a distinct view of children‘s legal status
that heralds a novel Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for children. The Eighth Amendment has
itself historically bent to ―evolving standards of decency‖ as reflected in both objective indicia of
those standards and the Court‘s own subjective analysis. 44 It now appears clear that the Court is
taking cognizance of society‘s own evolving and disparate views of children and adults to break
the Eighth Amendment into two strands: there will be different answers to the question of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment depending on the age and characteristics of the litigant
asking the question. We submit that this doctrinal development signals yet another period of
reform in how we manage and treat juvenile offenders, suggesting a return to the early Twentieth
Century view that kids are different—a view now fully backed by scientific research—while
retaining the constitutional protection that children have had since Kent and Gault.

atmosphere,‖ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, creates psychological pressures ―which work to undermine the individual‘s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.‖ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
41
In its October 2011 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases challenging the imposition of
a sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders convicted of homicide offenses. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-9647); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9646). Both Jackson and Miller were fourteenyears-old at the time of their offenses. Jackson v. Norris, No. 09-145, 2011 WL 478600, at *7 (Ark. 2011) (Danielson, J.,
dissenting); Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 682–83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Jackson, whose case arose in Arkansas, was
convicted of felony murder following the killing of a video store clerk by one of Jackson‘s co-defendants during the
course of an attempted robbery. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 89 (Ark. 2004). Miller, whose case arose in Alabama, was
convicted of first degree murder. Miller, 63 So. 3d at 682. Both boys received mandatory life without parole sentences
upon conviction under the applicable state laws, and the Alabama and Arkansas appellate courts rejected Petitioners‘
challenges to their sentences under the Eighth Amendment. See Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010);
Jackson v. Norris, No. 09-145, 2011 WL 478600 (Ark. 2011). In their challenges before the U.S. Supreme Court,
Petitioners argue that the sentences are prohibited under Graham v. Florida. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jackson v.
Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 (Ark. 2011) (No. 10-9647), 2011 WL 5322575; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v. Alabama, 63
So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568. In addition to challenging the sentences outright,
Petitioners also assert that their young age at the time of the offense, as well as the mandatory nature of the sentence,
compounds the constitutional infirmity of the sentence. See id. The cases will be argued in March 2012; a decision is
expected by the end of the Court‘s term. Supreme Court of the United States October 2011 Term, SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES (last updated Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars
/MonthlyArgumentViewer.aspx?Filename=MonthlyArgumentCalMar2012.html.

See TORBET ET AL., supra note 21, at xv (demonstrating that state legislatures toughened laws ―targeting
serious and violent juvenile offenders‖).
42

43
See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 20, at 27 (arguing that youth labeled ―superpredators‖ are capable of
equally heinous crimes as adults).
44

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1958).
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DEVELOPMENTAL IMMATURITY: RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT

Researchers in the field of developmental psychology use the concept of ―developmental
immaturity‖ to describe an adolescent‘s still-developing neurological, cognitive, behavioral,
emotional, and social capacity.45 Emerging research in this area indicates that developmental
immaturity consists of four components distinguishing adolescents from adults: independent
functioning, decision-making, emotion regulation, and general cognitive processing.46
Research documenting the differences between juveniles and adults suggests that
developmental immaturity may necessitate different treatment of adolescents under the Eighth
Amendment. Using the construct of developmental immaturity as a guide, the discussion that
follows reviews four areas of functioning most relevant to our understanding of the application of
the Eighth Amendment to adolescent sentencing and conditions: decision-making, impulsivity,
vulnerability, and the transitory nature of adolescence.
A. Decision-Making
Broadly, decision-making refers to the various cognitive, emotional, and social factors
that influence how individuals process information and arrive at conclusions. Some core
components involved in decision-making include the capacity to consider future consequences,
weigh costs and benefits, and recognize risks. 47 As the evidence research below demonstrates,
juveniles are less capable of making developmentally mature decisions than adults.
Recent research on adolescent decision-making suggests that youth are heavily
influenced by social and emotional factors. 48 Adolescents are overwhelmingly more likely than
adults to engage in risky behavior despite a similar ability to appraise risk. This can be explained,
in part, through the psychosocial factors that are likely to influence decision-making, particularly
among adolescents: 1) responsibility, which refers to acting independently and having a clear
understanding of one‘s self; 2) perspective, which involves understanding multiple viewpoints of
a situation; and 3) temperance, which is the ability to modulate impulsive thoughts and
behaviors.49 Empirical research on these factors reveals that psychosocial maturity continues to
develop into early adulthood.50 Thus, the evidence suggests that adolescents have pronounced
deficits in areas that can influence how they act in high-risk or criminal contexts.
Adolescents‘ decision-making is also likely to be influenced by affective, or emotional,
factors. Research has identified three different ways in which emotions can shape the decisionmaking process: 1) anticipated emotional outcomes; 2) anticipatory emotions; and 3) incidental

45

See generally Kathleen Kemp et al., Characteristics of Developmental Immaturity: A Cross-Disciplinary
Survey of Psychologists (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Drexel University) (on file with Hagerty Library,
Drexel University) (arguing that developmental immature contains the above characteristics).
46

Id. at viii.

47

Id. at 16.

48

See Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON
ADOLESCENCE 211, 217 (2011) (explaining that ―socioemotional stimuli‖ has an impact on adolescent decision-making).
49
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents
May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 744–745 (2000).
50

Id. at 752–53.
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emotions.51 First, individuals may choose to perform particular behaviors in a given situation by
evaluating the anticipated emotional outcomes of various behavioral options. Behaviors that
seem likely to increase positive emotions tend to become more desirable, even if they carry with
them a degree of risk.52 Second, individuals‘ direct emotional responses to various behaviors also
may guide their decision-making.53 For instance, individuals tend to approach behavioral
situations to which they have positive emotional responses and avoid those situations that evoke
negative emotions. Finally, incidental, or background, emotions can influence judgments about
the risk or desirability of certain behavioral options. 54 Because adolescence is a period of
emotional instability, these emotional influences are particularly salient in adolescents‘ decisionmaking.55
Moreover, adolescent decision-making is characterized by sensation- and reward-seeking
behavior,56 which tends to intensify from childhood to adolescence before declining from late
adolescence through the mid-20s.57 This curvilinear trend in reward-seeking—peaking in
adolescence before declining—may be partially based on adolescents‘ differing sensitivity to
reward and punishment. Recent research suggests that while sensitivity to punishment develops
in a linear manner (steadily increasing throughout adolescence), reward sensitivity follows a
curvilinear, developmental path that parallels the reward-seeking pattern—peaking in adolescence
before declining in adulthood.58
In sum, empirical research has revealed that juveniles have different decision-making
abilities than adults in that they are less able to engage in psychosocially mature evaluations of
situations and consequences of their decisions, and that they simultaneously have an increased
sensitivity to the affective and reward components of behavior. This research suggests that, as a
group, juveniles are less responsible and, therefore, may be less culpable for their decisions than
adults. Although each juvenile develops at his or her own rate, and may respond uniquely to
different contexts, these differences in decision-making processes broadly distinguish the
functioning of adolescents, as a class, from that of adults.
B. Impulsivity
Impulsivity has been defined as ―a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to
internal or external stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the
impulsive individuals or others.‖59 As mentioned above, one psychosocial factor likely to
influence behavior is temperance, or the ability to regulate one‘s behavior and evaluate a situation
51

See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 216-17 (defining anticipated emotional outcomes, anticipatory
emotions, and incidental emotions).
52

Id. at 217.

53

Id. at 217.

54

Id.

55

Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1013.

56

Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010).
57

Id. at 219–20.

58

Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on
the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEV. PSYCHOL. 193, 193 (2010).
59

Matthew S. Stanford et al., Fifty Years of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale: An Update and Review, 47
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 385, 385 (2009).
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before one acts.60 In other words, impulsivity can be thought of as actions in the absence of
formal decision-making. Because ―impulsivity‖ describes behaviors with minimal or complete
lack of forethought, it merits consideration in discussions of culpability.
Adolescents‘ tendencies to act impulsively are well documented in the psychological
literature.
Recent research demonstrates that impulsivity declines steadily throughout
adolescence and early adulthood, with appreciable declines evident into the mid-twenties.61
Greater levels of impulsivity during adolescence may be based on adolescents‘ weak future
orientation and disinclination to consider or anticipate the consequences of decisions.62 The
tendency to choose small immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards declines steadily
throughout adolescence.63 Research also demonstrates significant age differences in planning
ahead (e.g., adolescents are more likely to think that planning ahead is a ―waste of time‖); time
perspective (e.g., adolescents are more likely to report that they ―would rather be happy today
than take their chances on what might happen in the future‖); and anticipation of future
consequences (e.g., adolescents are more likely to report that they ―don‘t think it‘s necessary to
think about every little possibility before making a decision‖). 64 This focus on immediate benefits
contributes to the high rates of impulsivity among adolescents that distinguishes adolescent and
adult culpability.
C. Vulnerability
Immaturity in independent functioning, decision-making, and emotional regulation can
make adolescents particularly susceptible to risky decision-making, peer influence and adult
coercion, and greater sensitivity to invasions of privacy. Consequently, in many legal contexts,
adolescents are recognized as a vulnerable population. 65
Adolescent vulnerability is well-documented in developmental research. First, research
suggests that adolescents demonstrate lower levels of independent functioning, as manifested in
their poor self-reliance and weak self-concept.66 Poor self-reliance is evidenced in adolescents‘
difficulty demonstrating independence from peers and authority figures and their concomitant
need for social validation. Weak self-concept can be seen in adolescents‘ difficulty recognizing
personal strengths and weaknesses and developing individual values. 67 This murky sense of self
can heighten adolescents‘ vulnerability through their reliance on others (either peers or adults) to
60

Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 49, at 745.

61

Steinberg, supra note 56, at 220–21.

62

Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD. DEV.
28, 29–30 (2009).
63

Id. at 28, 36.

64

Id. at 34–35.

65

See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (abolishing the death penalty for
juvenile offenders); Richard E. Redding, Children‟s Competence to Provide Informed Consent for Mental Health
Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 697 (1993) (noting the traditional view that children cannot consent to
treatment); Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders‟ Miranda Rights Comprehension and Self-Reported
Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 359 (2003) (discussing juveniles‘ Miranda
comprehension deficits and vulnerability during interrogations).
66

Kemp et al., supra note 45, at 16.

67

Id. at 16.
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guide their decision-making and behavior.
This compromised independent functioning can make adolescents particularly vulnerable
to peer pressure and compliance with authority. According to Steinberg and Scott, ―Peer
influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly. In some contexts, adolescents
make choices in response to direct peer pressure to act in certain ways. More indirectly,
adolescents‘ desire for peer approval—and fear of rejection—affect their choices, even without
direct coercion.‖68 Early research on direct peer pressure suggests that adolescents‘ tendency to
choose an antisocial activity suggested by their peers over a prosocial activity of their own
choosing peaks in early- to mid-adolescence and declines slowly into adulthood.69 Adolescents
are far more likely to take risks in the presence of peers, including instances without direct
pressure or coercion. For example, in one study, adolescents took twice as many risks on a
driving task when peers were present than when they were alone, running yellow lights at the risk
of being hit by an unseen car. 70
Also, youth tend to yield to the demands of authority figures, 71 complying with adults
based on a blanket acceptance of their authority, rather than as a result of the youths‘ reasoning
about an adult‘s request.72 Thus, adolescents‘ decision-making skills can be further compromised
when confronted with a demand or request by an authority figure.
In addition to cognitive characteristics that differentiate adolescents‘ functioning from
that of adults, developmental immaturity is characterized by differences in the ability to regulate
emotions. Adolescents tend to demonstrate difficulties recognizing and expressing feelings,
managing their emotions, and coping with undesirable feelings. 73 This places adolescents at a
disadvantage in high stress situations, and consistent or chronic exposure to stressful stimuli can,
in turn, reduce adolescents‘ opportunities to develop successful emotional regulation abilities.74
Factors such as childhood maltreatment,75 maternal depression,76 exposure to violence,77 and
economic deprivation78 are associated with poor emotion regulation (i.e., emotion
―dysregulation‖) in children and adolescents. Empirical evidence also has shown that adolescents
with poor emotion regulation often demonstrate both internalizing (e.g., depression and anxiety)

68

Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1012.

69

Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608,

615 (1979).
70
Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky
Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 629–30 (2005).
71
Lila Ghent Braine et al., Conflicts with Authority: Children‟s Feelings, Actions, and Justifications, 27
DEV. PSYCHOL. 829, 834 (1991).
72

Id. at 835.

73

Kemp et al., supra note 45, at 28.

74

Liliana J. Lengua, The Contribution of Emotionality and Self-Regulation to the Understanding of
Children‟s Response to Multiple Risk, 73 CHILD DEV. 144, 156 (2002).
75

Angeline Maughan & Dante Cicchetti, Impact of Child Maltreatment and Interadult Violence on
Children‟s Emotion Regulation Abilities and Socioemotional Adjustment, 73 CHILD DEV. 1525, 1534 (2002).
76

Angeline Maughan et al., Early-occurring Maternal Depression and Maternal Negativity in Predicting
Young Children‟s Emotion Regulation and Socioemotional Difficulties, 35 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 685, 695
(2007).
77

Maughan & Cicchetti, supra note 75, at 1534–35.

78

Id. at 1540.
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and externalizing (e.g., aggressive behaviors) symptoms, 79 and rates of these symptoms and
associated mental health diagnoses are elevated among youth involved in the justice system.80
Compared with adults, juveniles are particularly vulnerable to the influence and
manipulation of others. Youths‘ underdeveloped sense of personal identity and independence,
coupled with their compromised decision-making abilities, place them at-risk for susceptibility to
direct and indirect coercion by peers and authority figures. Furthermore, juveniles have trouble
regulating their emotions and have a heightened sensitivity to invasions of privacy—particularly
when they have experienced economic or social disadvantages. Together, these findings suggest
that juveniles, as a class, have unique needs for protection and guidance that are greater than and
different from the needs of adults.
D. Transitory Nature of Adolescence
Adolescence is inherently transitory; this period ultimately ends as do the deficits that are
uniquely associated with developmental immaturity. As researchers Scott and Steinberg have
explained, ―The period is transitional because it is marked by rapid and dramatic change within
the individual in the realms of biology, cognition, emotion, and interpersonal relationships. . . .
Even the word ‗adolescence‘ has origins that connote its transitional nature: it derives from the
Latin verb adolescere, to grow into adulthood.‖81
As much of the research outlined above reveals, different components of developmental
immaturity either peak in adolescence and then decline into early adulthood (e.g., rewardseeking), or steadily decline throughout childhood and adolescence (e.g., impulsivity). 82 In sum,
as youth grow, so do their self-management skills and ability for long-term planning, judgment
and decision-making, regulation of emotion, and evaluation of risk and reward. 83 Thus, many of
the factors associated with antisocial, risky, or criminal behavior lose their intensity as individuals
become more developmentally mature.
There is also empirical evidence directly relating the transitory nature of adolescence to
delinquent and criminal behavior. The distinction between individuals who offend only during
adolescence and those who persist in offending into adulthood is well established in the
psychological literature.84 One researcher estimated that ―chronic‖ juvenile offenders (i.e., those
with five or more arrests) account for only about six percent of the juvenile offender population. 85
A more recent study followed over one thousand serious male adolescent offenders (i.e., those
who had committed felony offenses with the exception of less serious property crimes and
misdemeanor weapons or sexual assault offenses) over the course of three years and revealed that
79
Jungmeen Kim & Dante Cicchetti, Longitudinal Pathways Linking Child Maltreatment, Emotion
Regulation, Peer Relations, and Psychopathology, 51 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 706, 712–13 (2010).
80

See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Mental Health Disorders: The Neglected Risk Factor in Juvenile
Delinquency, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 85, 85 (Kirk Heilbrun, Naomi
E. Sevin Goldstein, & Richard E. Redding eds., 2005).
81

ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 31 (2008).

82

See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 56, at 220–21.

83

Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1011.

84

Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental
Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993).
85

Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime: Lessons Learned, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75, 77–78

(1996).
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only 8.7% of participants were found to be ―persisters‖ in that their offending remained constant
throughout the thirty-six-month period.86 The vast majority of youth who engage in delinquent
acts desist, and ―the typical delinquent youth does not grow up to become an adult criminal.‖ 87 In
other words, not only are youth developmentally capable of change, research also demonstrates
that, when given a chance, even youth with histories of violent crime can and do become
productive and law abiding citizens, without any intervention.
Although the mere process of physiological and psychological growth will rehabilitate
most adolescents, more than fifteen years of research on interventions for juvenile offenders has
yielded rich data on the effectiveness of programs to reduce recidivism and cut costs,
underscoring rehabilitation as a realistic goal for the overwhelming majority of juvenile offenders,
including violent and repeat offenders. Examples of programs shown to be effective with violent
and aggressive youth include Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multidimensional Therapeutic
Foster Care (MTFC), and Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST).88 All three have been shown to reduce
recidivism rates significantly, even for serious violent offenders. 89 Thus, many juvenile offenders
have the potential to achieve rehabilitation and become productive citizens.
E. Neurological Differences Between Youth and Adults
Recent research using advances in neuro-imaging has revealed that many of the
components of developmental immaturity, reviewed above, have a neurological basis. First,
brain-imaging research has revealed that the brain‘s frontal lobes are structurally immature into
late adolescence, making them one of the last parts of the brain to fully develop. 90 Because the
frontal lobes are primarily responsible for executive functions, their structural immaturity during
much of adolescence is partially responsible for youths‘ deficits in response inhibition, planning
ahead, and weighing risks and rewards. 91 Not only is this area of the brain underdeveloped in
adolescence, research has shown that this area is less active in adolescents than it is in adults.92
86
Edward P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following
Court Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 453, 462 (2010).
87

Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 27, at 1015.

88

See PETER W. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY

70 (2006).
89

See Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term
Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 573 (1995) (describing the
effectiveness of MST in reducing recidivism rates even for serious offenders with histories of repeat felonies); J. Mark
Eddy et al., The Prevention of Violent Behavior by Chronic and Serious Male Juvenile Offenders: A 2-Year Follow-up of a
Randomized Clinical Trial, 12 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 2, 2–7 (2004) (describing reduced recidivism rates
for violent and chronically offending youth who participated in MTFC); W. Jeff Hinton et al., Juvenile Justice: A System
Divided, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL‘Y REV. 466, 475 (2007) (describing FFT‘s success with drug-abusing youth, violent youth,
and serious juvenile offenders); Carol M. Schaeffer & Charles M. Borduin, Long-Term Follow-Up to a Randomized
Clinical Trial of Multisystemic Therapy With Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 445, 449–452 (2005) (finding that the benefits of MST often extend into adulthood).
90
See Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in
Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 197 (1999); Nitin Gogtay et al.,
Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCEEDINGS
NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8174 (2004).
91

Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217.

92

K. Rubia et al., Functional Frontalisation with Age: Mapping Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with
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And, as adolescents move into early adulthood, increasing amounts of brain activity shift to the
frontal lobes.93 Researchers understand these patterns to be linked to the steady decline of
impulsivity throughout adolescence and into adulthood. 94 That is, decreased levels of impulsivity
seem to coincide with increased levels of frontal lobe maturity.
Second, the limbic system changes during puberty and is particularly active in adolescent
brains.95 The limbic system is generally regarded as the socio-emotional center of the brain, and,
therefore, its changes and activity level during this time are particularly relevant to the discussion
of adolescent decision-making.96 Far from acting in isolation, adolescents‘ underdeveloped
frontal lobes and highly active and changing limbic systems interact. Therefore, while
adolescents are still maturing, the frontal lobes are less able to exert control over behavior and
emotions, making adolescents even more vulnerable to social and emotional cues in decisionmaking.97
Finally, the dopaminergic system, the system involved in the transmission of the
chemical dopamine which plays an important role in processing rewards, is restructured during
adolescence.98 The dopaminergic system‘s connections to the limbic system and frontal lobes
increase during mid- and late-adolescence and then decline.99 These changes may lead to the
increase in reward-seeking behavior and heightened responsiveness to rewards observed among
adolescents.
Youths‘ developmental immaturity leads them to function differently than adults in
independent functioning, decision-making, emotion regulation, and general cognitive processing.
These differences have been observed in behavioral studies as well as studies documenting the
neurological changes that take place during adolescence and early adulthood. Adolescents‘
resulting deficits in certain areas, such as decision-making and impulsivity, along with their
heightened vulnerability and the inherently transitory nature of adolescence, suggest that they
should be treated differently under the Eighth Amendment.
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA AND ROPER V. SIMMONS: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT EMBEDS ITS EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
JUVENILE SENTENCES IN RESEARCH
On May 17, 2010, in Graham v. Florida,100 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
sentences of life without the possibility of parole imposed on juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 101 In an
opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that such a severe and irrevocable punishment

fMRI, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 13, 18 (2000).
93

Id.

94

Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217.

95

Rubia, supra note 92, at 18.

96

Albert & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 217.

97

Id. at 219.

98

See Steinberg, supra note 56, at 217.

99

Id.

100

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).

101

Id. at 2034.
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was not appropriate for a less culpable juvenile offender. 102 In banning the sentence, Justice
Kennedy underscored that case law, developmental research, and neuroscience all recognize that
children are different from adults—they are less culpable for their actions and at the same time
have a greater capacity to change and mature.103 Justice Kennedy‘s opinion was rooted in the
Court‘s earlier analysis in Roper v. Simmons,104 which had held the death penalty unconstitutional
as applied to juveniles. The Graham Court echoed the reasoning in Roper that three essential
characteristics distinguish youth from adults for culpability purposes: youth lack maturity and
responsibility; they are vulnerable and susceptible to peer pressure; and their characters are
unformed.105 Justice Kennedy reasoned:
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper
about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner‘s amici point out, developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in
behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are
more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be
evidence of ‗irretrievably depraved character‘ than are the actions of adults. 106
The majority made clear in Graham and Roper that the constitutionality of a particular
punishment for juveniles (i.e., whether it is cruel and unusual) is directly tied to prevailing
research on adolescent development, and that juvenile status is central to the constitutional
analysis.
A. A New Look at Juvenile Sentencing
Together, Graham and Roper provide the framework for a novel, developmentally driven
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that should force a more rigorous examination of permissible
sentencing options for juvenile offenders in the criminal justice system. 107 In Graham, the Court
102

Id. at 2027–28.

103

Id. at 2026.

104

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

105

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).

106

Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (internal citations omitted).

107

These decisions should also be read against the backdrop of a series of Supreme Court decisions over the
last several decades in which the Court has repeatedly accorded children and youth distinct treatment under the
Constitution. While the Court‘s consideration of juvenile status is particularly pronounced in cases involving children in
the juvenile and criminal justice systems, the characteristics of youth have also led to a specialized jurisprudence under the
First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (determining that age of juvenile is relevant to a Miranda v.
Arizona custody analysis under the Fourth Amendment). In civil cases, as well, the Supreme Court has frequently
expressed its view that children are different from adults, and has tailored its constitutional analysis accordingly.
Reasoning that ―during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack . . . experience, perspective,
and judgment,‖ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979), the Court has upheld greater state restrictions on minors‘
exercise of reproductive choice. Id. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990). The Court has also held that different obscenity standards apply to children
than to adults under the First Amendment in Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968), and has concluded that the
state has a compelling interest in protecting children from images that are ―harmful to minors.‖ Denver Area Educ.
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held that an indefinite sentence was inherently at odds with the transient nature of adolescence.
Justice Kennedy explained:
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the
offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him
or her some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term. 108
In deciding challenges to sentencing practices under the Eighth Amendment, the Court
applies a two-part test: it considers objective indicia—including both state legislation and
sentencing practices, and it then brings its own judgment to bear on the issue. 109 The question of
objective indicia depends, by definition, on external factors. Conversely, the notion that the Court
must use its own judgment to determine whether a sentence conforms to the ―‗evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society‘‖ 110 has created the opening for the
Court‘s unique treatment of juvenile offenders.111 We therefore focus on this second prong of the
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc‘ns Comm‘n, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996). Similarly, the Court has upheld a
state‘s right to restrict when a minor can work, guided by the premise that ―[t]he state‘s authority over children‘s activities
is broader than over the actions of adults.‖ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). The Court‘s school prayer
cases similarly take into account the unique vulnerabilities of youth, and their particular susceptibility to coercion. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (observing that ―there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.‖). See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311–12, 317 (2000).
108

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (―The analysis begins with objective indicia of national consensus.‖); id.
at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575) (―In accordance with the constitutional design, ‗the task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.‖). The Court has long recognized the independent role it plays in
evaluating sentences under the Eighth Amendment. In Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977), where the Court held
that a sentence of death was impermissible in cases of rape, the Court specifically acknowledged that the objective
evidence, while important, did not ―wholly determine‖ the issue, ―for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.‖ See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
109

Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for
us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on
one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by
others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force will be employed. We have concluded, along with most legislatures and juries, that it does
not.
Id.
110

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).

In Roper, Justice Kennedy specifically noted the Court‘s ―rule‖ that ―‗the Constitution contemplates that
in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment.‘‖ 543 U.S. at 563 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)) (internal quotations
omitted). Justice Kennedy wrote, ―Last, to the extent Stanford [v. Kentucky] was based on a rejection of the idea that this
Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class
of crimes or offenders, it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions.‖
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (internal citations omitted). See also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575)
(internal citations omitted) (―Community consensus, while ‗entitled to great weight,‘ is not itself determinative of whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual. . . . In accordance with the constitutional design, ‗the task of interpreting the Eighth
111
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analysis to examine the Court‘s exercise of its own judgment, in light of evolving standards,
regarding the constitutionality of a particular punishment.
The Court‘s perception of proportionality is central to its judgment about whether a
certain punishment is cruel and unusual. 112 The Court in Graham explained that cases addressing
the proportionality of sentences ―fall within two general classifications. The first involves
challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular
case.‖113 Under the first classification, the Court considers the circumstances of the case in its
determination whether the sentence is ―unconstitutionally excessive.‖ 114 Justice Kennedy directs
courts to first compare ―the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.‖ 115 In the rare
case where this ―‗threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,‘ the
court should then compare the defendant‘s sentence with the sentences received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.‖116 If this comparative analysis ―‗validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence
is grossly disproportionate,‘ the sentence is cruel and unusual.‖ 117
The second, ―categorical‖ classification of cases assesses the proportionality of a
sentence as compared to the nature of the offense or the ―characteristics of the offender.‖118 In
―categorical‖ cases, the Court may deem a particular sentence unconstitutional for an entire class

Amendment remains our responsibility.‖). In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court, in exercising its independent judgment
to determine whether the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, wrote, ―[W]e first ask whether the juvenile‘s culpability should be
measured by the same standard as that of an adult, and then consider whether the application of the death penalty to this
class of offenders ‗measurably contributes‘ to the social purposes that are served by the death penalty.‖ 487 U.S. 815, 833
(1988).
112
As the Graham court wrote, ―Embodied in the Constitution‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is
the ‗precept of justice that punishment for the crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.‖ 130 S. Ct. at
2021 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
113

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.

114

Id. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court invalidated under the Eighth Amendment a life
without parole sentence imposed on an adult offender following his conviction for a seventh non-violent felony, passing a
bad check. This followed the Court‘s upholding a life with parole sentence imposed on an adult offender following the
defendant‘s third conviction for a non-violent felony in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (defendant was convicted
of obtaining money under false pretenses). The Court distinguished Solem, noting that the defendant‘s sentence was ―far
more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle,‖ since it gave the defendant no chance for parole.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 297.
After Solem, adult defendants have had difficulty sustaining a challenge to the proportionality of a term of years sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. In Harmelin v. Michigan, a closely divided Court upheld a life without parole sentence for
possession of a large quality of cocaine. The controlling opinion wrote that the Eighth Amendment contains a ―narrow
proportionality principle‖ that ―does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,‖ but instead ―forbids
only extreme sentences that are ‗grossly disproportionate‘ to the crime.‖ 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding sentence of
twenty-five years to life for the theft of a few golf clubs under California‘s ―Three Strikes Law‖); Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding sentence of life in prison for two convictions of petty theft under California‘s ―Three
Strikes Law.‖).
115

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.

116

Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).

117

Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).

118

Id. (emphasis added).
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of offenders, due to shared characteristics that make them categorically less culpable than other
offenders who commit similar or identical crimes. 119 As part of this proportionality analysis, the
Court has tied the legitimacy of any particular sentence to a determination of whether the sentence
serves the acceptable purposes, or ―legitimate goals,‖ of punishment—retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.120 As demonstrated in Graham, a sentence disproportionate to
the penological objectives it claims to serve will doom many adult sentences imposed on
juveniles. It is this second strand of the Court‘s proportionality analysis, focused on the
characteristics of the offender, which invites a distinctive application of the Eighth Amendment to
juveniles.
As the Graham Court explained, ―a sentence lacking any legitimate penological
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense‖ and therefore unconstitutional.121
Relying on developmental and scientific research, the Graham Court held that none of the four
accepted rationales for the imposition of criminal sanctions was served by imposing a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile.122 The Court first rejected both retribution and deterrence as
proffered rationales for the sentence, echoing its earlier holding in Roper that emphasized the
reduced blameworthiness of juvenile offenders.123 It then rejected incapacitation as a justification
for life without parole sentences, further underscoring the folly of making irrevocable judgments
about youth:
To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment
that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that
judgment questionable. . . . Even if the State‘s judgment that Graham was
incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature,
the sentence was still disproportionate because that judgment was made at the
outset. A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity. Incapacitation cannot override all
other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment‘s rule against disproportionate
sentences be a nullity.124
The goal of rehabilitation was likewise rejected, as the Court found the punishment simply at odds
with the rehabilitative ideal.125 The Court stated, ―By denying the defendant the right to reenter
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person‘s value and place in
society‖—a judgment inconsistent with a juvenile non-homicide offender‘s ―capacity for change

119

Id. For other instances of the Court applying this sort of categorical approach, see, e.g., Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (applying the approach for defendants convicted of rape where the crime was not intended
to and did not result in the victim‘s death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (applying the approach to ban the
death penalty for defendants who committed crimes before turning 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (applying
the approach to ban the death penalty for defendants who are mentally retarded).
120

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 2030.

123

Id. at 2028–29.

124

Id. at 2029.

125

Id. at 2029–30.
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and limited moral culpability.‖126
In prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders in Roper five years earlier, the Court
expressly relied on many of the medical, psychological and sociological studies cited above, as
well as common experience. This evidence showed, and the majority held, that children under
age eighteen are ―‗categorically less culpable‘‖ and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults
who commit similar crimes.127 The Court reasoned that because juveniles have reduced
culpability, they cannot be subjected to the harshest penalty reserved for the most depraved adult
offenders; punishment for juveniles must be moderated to some degree to reflect their lesser
blameworthiness.128
As in Graham, the Roper Court stressed the incongruity of imposing a final and
irrevocable penalty on an adolescent who had the capacity to change and grow. ―From a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be reformed.‖ 129 The Court
underscored that the State was not permitted to extinguish the juvenile‘s ―potential to attain a
mature understanding of his own humanity.‖ 130 It noted that ―[t]he differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to
receive‖ a sentence of life without parole for a non-homicide crime. 131 The Graham Court then
expounded on this point:
These salient characteristics mean that ‗[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.‘ Accordingly, ‗juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.‘ A juvenile is
not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression ‗is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.‘‖ 132
Like Roper, the Court adopted a categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses. Without a categorical rule, the Court noted that an
―unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course . . . .‖ 133 Were the
Court to allow a case-by-case assessment of culpability, courts might not ―with sufficient
accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity
for change.‖134 Juvenile nonhomicide offenders are ―not sufficiently culpable to merit that
punishment.‖135 The categorical rule ―gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to

126

Id. at 2030.

127

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).

128

Id. at 571.

129

Id. at 570.

130

Id. at 574.

131

Id. at 572–73.

132

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 569; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
133

Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.

134

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
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demonstrate maturity and reform.‖136
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in Graham is an expansive statement about constitutional
limits on the wholesale extension of adult sentencing policies and practices to juvenile offenders.
Given the sharp differences between juvenile and adult offenders, rote application of adult
sentences will fail to pass constitutional muster. While the Court engaged in a routine Eighth
Amendment analysis—considering objective indicia of national consensus but then applying its
own independent judgment—it ultimately crafted a developmentally driven approach that
broadened its prior case law that ―death is different‖ 137 under the Eighth Amendment to include a
further guiding principle that ―kids are different.‖
Additionally, the Court‘s reluctance to impose adult sentences on juveniles derives from
its growing belief that punishment for youth must be individualized. The Court made clear that
the juvenile must be given an opportunity to demonstrate the capacity to change—not only at the
time of sentencing, but even over the course of time as he or she matures. The Court explained:
Even if the State‘s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were later
corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still
disproportionate because that judgment was made at the outset. A life without
parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate
growth and maturity. Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations,
lest the Eighth Amendment‘s rule against disproportionate sentences be a
nullity.138
Interestingly, this idea of individualized assessment is already embedded in the Court‘s capital
jurisprudence. The opportunity to show mitigation prior to the imposition of a sentence of death
is central to the Court‘s case law assessing the constitutionality of various death penalty
schemes.139
This well-developed jurisprudence on mitigation in death penalty cases has been
understood to apply because of the extraordinary nature of the punishment. The Court has
recognized that unique protections apply because ―death is a punishment different from all other
sanctions in kind rather than degree.‖140 Graham, however, eliminated the ―death is different‖
adult sentencing distinction—at least when juveniles are involved. This consequence of Graham
was expressly noted by the dissent. 141 Under Graham and Roper, sentences that would be deemed
135

Id. at 2030.

136

Id. at 2032.

137

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).

138

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.

The Court has held that, in adult death penalty cases, ―the fundamental respect for humanity underlying
the Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant be able to present any relevant mitigating evidence that could justify a
lesser sentence.‖ Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987). The sentencer must consider all mitigating evidence and
allow for individualized sentencing that hypothetically takes into account the full context in which the crime occurred. See
generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today‟s Arbitrary and Mandatory
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998) (arguing that the present capital sentencing scheme
is paradoxical insofar as it is both arbitrary and mandatory).
139

140

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976).

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―Today‘s decision eviscerates that distinction
[between capital and noncapital sentencing]. ‗Death is different‘ no longer.‖).
141
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appropriate for adult offenders would be unconstitutional for a child who committed like offenses.
In the wake of these cases, courts should similarly look to mitigating factors that may justify a
less harsh sentence whenever a child receives a sentence designed for an adult. 142 To ensure that
sentences for juveniles are not unconstitutionally disproportionate, courts should evaluate
mitigating factors including the juvenile‘s age, level of involvement in the offense, external or
coercive pressures surrounding the criminal conduct, and other relevant characteristics. These
factors should be considered in light of the juvenile‘s diminished capacity, increased impulsivity,
and capacity for change or rehabilitation.
As Justice Frankfurter wrote over fifty years ago in May v. Anderson,143 ―[c]hildren have
a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other
cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State‘s
duty towards children.‖144 Today, adult sentencing practices that take no account of youth—
indeed permit no consideration of youth—are unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to
juveniles. This approach builds upon recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that recognizes that
juveniles who commit crimes—even serious or violent crimes—can outgrow this behavior and
become responsible adults, and therefore courts cannot make judgments about their
irredeemability at the outset.145
B. A New Look at Juvenile Conditions of Confinement
With the shift in focus from the constitutional procedural protections of the 1960s and
1970s to the harsher penalties of the 1980s and 1990s, the constitutional analysis of juvenile
conditions cases also changed. The 1970s saw a spate of cases striking down juvenile conditions
as unconstitutional, resting on the same premise as the juvenile court itself—juveniles deserved
treatment and rehabilitation.146 The cases also recognized juveniles‘ unique vulnerability and the
resulting trauma that harsh conditions could impose on them. 147 More recently, however, courts
have rarely struck down conditions as interfering with the right to treatment.148
The reasoning of both Roper and Graham, however, may now create new opportunities
in juvenile conditions cases. The underlying recognition that youth are more vulnerable, more
susceptible to outside pressures, and more capable of change than their adult counterparts
suggests that courts may be more protective of incarcerated juveniles. Harmful or deplorable
142
Because youth are categorically less culpable than adults, courts should always treat their youth as a
mitigating factor that may justify a lesser sentence. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (finding that youths‘ irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult and that juveniles‘ own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean that they have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment). Other mitigating factors that courts typically consider may also
be affected by a youth‘s age, immaturity, and development.
143

345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).

144

Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

145

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

146

For a thoughtful discussion of the history of juvenile conditions cases and a more detailed consideration
of how the courts protected a right to treatment, see Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23.
See, e.g., Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 482 (1970) (relying heavily on
expert testimony that isolation would be uniquely damaging to an adolescent); see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352,
357 (7th Cir. 1974).
147

148

Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1801–1812.
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conditions, which have been found constitutional in cases involving adults, may therefore be
unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles—both because the impact of the harm is more
significant for juveniles, and because the expectation of treatment and rehabilitation is higher.
1.

Problems Facing Confined Youth

Whether in juvenile or adult institutions, confined juveniles face harsh conditions. One
report, for example, identified maltreatment of youth in juvenile facilities in thirty-nine states,
plus the District of Columbia since 1970, as evidenced by federal investigations, class-action
lawsuits or authoritative reports.149 Juveniles in these states faced excessive use of isolation or
restraints, systemic violence, and physical and sexual abuse.150 Moreover, such maltreatment has
been documented in twenty-two states since 2000.151 These numbers may reflect significant
under-reporting because youth have little access to counsel, members of the media, or other ways
of having their stories heard—and because youth may often fear retaliation if they report abuse.
In adult facilities, conditions may be even more dangerous for youth. Youth confined
with adults are more likely to be physically or sexually abused, and to commit suicide than those
in juvenile facilities.152 In fact, suicide is the number one cause of death for juveniles in adult
jails.153 Attempts by facilities‘ staff to protect youth—generally by placing youth in isolation or
administrative segregation, can cause even further damage:
An individual held in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day typically begins to
lose his sense of reality, and becomes paranoid, anxious and despondent, all of
which can exacerbate existing mental health conditions. Given that many of the
youth being held in adult jails have experienced some serious trauma in their
lives or have undiagnosed or untreated mental illness, they are particularly
vulnerable.154
Moreover, even under similar conditions, and without increased risk of abuse, youth are uniquely
vulnerable to the trauma of incarceration in poor conditions. ―From a developmental perspective,
. . . juveniles need to be with family members and are perhaps more vulnerable to emotional harm
from incarceration than adults.‖155 The harsh, and even potentially fatal, conditions for youth in
149
RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING
JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5–7 (2011).
150

Id.

151

Id. at 5.

152

Emily Ray, Comment, Waiver, Certification and Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers in Texas, 13 SCHOLAR 317, 320 (2010).
153

MARGARET NOONAN, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000-2007 9 (2010).

154

Terry F. Hickey & Camilla Roberson, Pretrial Detention of Youth Prosecuted as Adults, 44-DEC MD.
B.J. 44, 48 (2011).
Margaret Beyer, Juvenile Detention to “Protect” Children from Neglect, 3 D.C. L. REV. 373, 373 (1995);
see also N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a strip search would be uniquely damaging to a
juvenile, but upholding some of the strip searches at issue). In her dissenting opinion, then Judge Sotomayor underscored
the harm from such a search that would be ―demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant,
embarrassing, [and] repulsive.‖ Id. at 239 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983)).
155
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both juvenile and adult facilities, and their unique vulnerability to harm, highlight the importance
of the constitutional standard.
2.

The Adult Standard: A Tough Bar

As applied to adult prisoners, the Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
calls for significant deference to prison officials. In early cases, the Court applied the Eighth
Amendment to address sentencing rather than prison conditions. In 1910, for example, the
Supreme Court held a sentence unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who had falsified
documents regarding a small sum of money. 156 The defendant had been sentenced to a minimum
of twelve years of prison with hard labor, followed by voting disqualification, ongoing
surveillance and restrictions on his residency after his release., 157 The Court, observing that the
sentence was highly disproportionate to the crime, concluded that it violated the Eighth
Amendment.158 Since then, the Court has established that certain sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment—the denial of citizenship,159 the imposition of the death penalty without proper
procedural protections,160 or, as discussed above, the imposition of the death penalty161 or life
without parole to certain categories of less culpable individuals. 162
In 1976, petitioners in Estelle v. Gamble asked the Court to consider whether the Eighth
Amendment protects prisoners from harsh prison conditions—in that case the provision of
inadequate medical care—even when the initial sentence imposed was constitutional. 163 The
Court held that the Eighth Amendment did govern such behavior, concluding that ―deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs‖ by prison staff could constitute the ―‗unnecessary wanton
infliction of pain‘ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.‖ 164 To hold to the contrary, the Court
observed, would allow ―the infliction of . . . unnecessary suffering,‖ and would be ―inconsistent
with contemporary standards of decency . . . .‖165 Ultimately, however, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment had not been violated when prison doctors prescribed painkillers and rest for
the prisoner‘s back pain, but did not seek an x-ray or take other steps to identify and treat his pain.
Although an x-ray might have revealed a more accurate diagnosis, the failure to provide one was,
at most, cause for a malpractice claim and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 166 In
Estelle, as a result, the Court established the possibility of Eighth Amendment claims for pure
conditions cases, but also set a high bar for what would constitute such a violation. The Court
further solidified this approach in Rhodes v. Chapman, holding that the double celling of prisoners
did not violate the Constitution.167 The Court concluded that, at most, double celling ―inflicts
156

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).

157

Id. at 364.

158

Id. at 382.

159

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion).

160

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).

161

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).

162

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

163

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

164

Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

165

Id. at 103.

166

Id. at 106.

167

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48 (1981).
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pain,‖ but concluded that it did not constitute the ―unnecessary or wanton‖ infliction of pain that
violates the Eighth Amendment.168 ―[T]he Constitution,‖ the Court stated, ―does not mandate
comfortable prisons.‖169 Thus, the prisoners‘ additional complaints regarding limited job and
educational opportunities did not rise to the level of constitutional violations. 170 Scholars have
noted that Rhodes initiated a line of cases curtailing the use of the Eighth Amendment to
challenge prison conditions.171 Indeed the Rhodes Court explicitly asserted that ―[t]o the extent
that such conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.‖172
In subsequent cases, the Court further defined the standard for Eighth Amendment
conditions cases—and established a uniquely high burden on prisoners seeking relief through the
Eighth Amendment. In particular, the Court held that the Constitution was violated in conditions
cases only if the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 173 In 1994, in Farmer v.
Brennan, the Court clarified the precise level of intent prison officials must demonstrate to
warrant liability under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer involved a male-to-female transsexual
prisoner‘s complaint that the prison had failed to protect her from assault by the male inmates
with whom she was placed.174 The Court clarified that ―deliberate indifference‖ to the prisoner‘s
need depended on both an objective and subjective component. 175 The harm to the prisoner must
be objectively sufficiently serious, denying a prisoner ―the minimal civilized measure of life‘s
necessities . . . .‖176 It must also be based on the subjective state of mind of the prison official,
which, Farmer clarified, must be more than mere negligence, though it could fall short of intent to
harm.177 The Court concluded that liability under the Eighth Amendment would apply when a
prison official ―knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.‖178 Under this standard, ―[i]nmates
have the difficult task of exposing the prison official‘s state of mind.‖ 179 Although not a complete
bar to relief, this standard has imposed significant obstacles to establishing liability in adult prison
conditions cases.

168

Id. at 348 (emphasis added).

169

Id. at 349.

170

Id. at 348.

171

Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1806.

172

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

173

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).

174

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).

175

Id. at 838.

176

Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).

177

Id. at 835.

178

Id. at 837.

179

Christine Rebman, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection
from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 602 (1999). See also Higgins v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., 178
F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that medical staff did not ―consciously disregard‖ the risk of harm when they failed to
treat Plaintiff‘s dislocated shoulder—even though he had informed them that the shoulder had ―popped out of joint‖ and a
nurse testified that it was hanging ―forward and lower than right‖). The fact that the Plaintiff had not seemed to be in great
pain convinced the court that the medical staff did not consciously disregard the risk.
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As currently understood, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments require only
freedom from unnecessary restraint and minimally humane conditions of
confinement. Food, clothing, shelter and medical care must only be adequate
enough to avoid harm. In the main, treatment or training is directed at little
more than preserving the peace within the training school.
Moreover, to the extent that a violation of even these minimal standards occurs,
federal judges are precluded from issuing sweeping corrective injunctions by
the ―hands off‖ doctrine. As early as 1974, the United States Supreme Court
began to show great deference to prison administrators and to tell trial court
judges to refrain from interfering with the day-to-day operations of prisons.180
The trajectory of adult Eighth Amendment cases, as a result, has established a high bar for
prisoners alleging unconstitutional conditions.
In excessive use of force cases, deference to safety concerns makes the subjective
standard even more stringent; the Court will not hold the behavior unconstitutional unless
officials act ―maliciously and sadistically.‖181 In adult isolation cases, courts have also applied an
extraordinarily high bar, holding, for example, that the mere infliction of ―psychological pain‖
does not rise to the level of constitutional harm.182 The recent Supreme Court case of Brown v.
Plata, however, provides some hope for prisoners seeking redress through the Eighth
Amendment. Affirming the lower court‘s order that prisoners be released to prevent
overcrowding, Plata held that the overcrowding was so severe that it led to the violation of
prisoners‘ rights to medical and mental health care and safe conditions. 183 Because overcrowding,
rather than an individual correctional staff person‘s action, led to the conditions at issue, the Court
did not touch upon the subjective inquiry. Instead, the Court simply concluded that ―[j]ust as a
prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care.
A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.‖ 184 While
this reasoning may be limited to overcrowding cases, it does open the door to arguments that
focus on the effect on prisoners, rather than the intent of the officials. Because the Court not only
addressed medical care, but also made significant mention of the highly troubling situation in
which mentally ill inmates were held in administrative segregation for months at a time, Plata
also opens the door to applying this analysis to a broader array of conditions. 185
3.

A New Juvenile Standard

The adult standard, although evolving, is still not appropriate for juveniles. As one
scholar explained,
180

Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 23, at 1807.

181

Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 91 GEO. L.J. 887, 910 (2003).

182

See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1263–64 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (recognizing, however, that
isolation can violate the Eighth Amendment when it inflicts serious mental illness).
183

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924–26 (2011).

184

Id. at 1928.

185

Id. at 1933; see also Erica Goode, Prisons Rethink Isolation, Saving Money, Lives & Sanity, N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/us/rethinking-solitary-confinement.html?pagewanted=all.
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The constitutional protection available to a child in detention should be more
extensive than the protection against punishment applicable to an adult pre-trial
detainee in a criminal case. After all, the state‘s purpose is different. The end
result of a juvenile delinquency case is not simply punishment but, based upon
state statute, some form of rehabilitation combined with protection of the
public. Furthermore, on a practical level children differ from adults. Their
needs are different. The injuries that can befall them in detention are both
different and greater than adults. Public officials cannot rely upon the maturity
of a child as they can an adult. 186
The recognition in Roper and Graham that juveniles are categorically less mature in their
decision-making capacity, more vulnerable to outside pressures including peer pressure, and have
personalities that are more transitory and less fixed, 187 underscores that courts cannot simply
apply the adult constitutional standard to juveniles. And, indeed, the Court has long explicitly
recognized the need for tailoring the Constitutional analysis to youth, observing that ―[l]egal
theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning i[f] uncritically
transferred to determination of a state‘s duty toward children.‖188
The Supreme Court has never squarely established the constitutional standard for
juvenile conditions cases.189 The Court has clarified, however, that a less deferential Fourteenth
Amendment standard applies in situations in which punishment is not the primary goal.190 For
example, individuals confined for treatment purposes, such as those involuntarily confined to
mental health facilities, ―are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement
than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.‖191 Similarly, for adults
in pre-trial detention not yet convicted of a crime, challenged conditions are unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment if they amount to punishment. 192
Applying a similar analysis, the majority of jurisdictions have therefore applied the
Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment to juvenile conditions cases. 193 This approach is
further supported by the numerous Supreme Court cases applying a Fourteenth Amendment
standard generally to challenged practices and policies of the juvenile justice system, in
recognition of the system‘s uniquely rehabilitative and non-criminal nature.194
186
Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in Juvenile
Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 702 (1998).
187

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2038 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70).

188

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (―We find . . . an inadequate basis for wrenching the
Eighth Amendment from its historical context and extending it to traditional disciplinary practices in the public schools.‖).
189

190

See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–25 (holding as erroneous instructions given to the
jury that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment in a case regarding the substantive rights of
involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons).
191

Id. at 322.

192

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

193

See, e.g., A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995); Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431–32
(9th Cir. 1987); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 1986); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F.
Supp. 773, 795-96 (D. S.C. 1995).
194
For example, in In re Gault, the Court applied the Fourteenth, rather than the Sixth Amendment to hold
that juveniles have a right to counsel. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1953))
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Under both the Fourteenth and the Eighth Amendment analysis, however, there remains
a significant lack of clarity on precisely how juvenile conditions should be assessed. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has established that ―the more protective fourteenth amendment
standard‖ applies to juvenile justice cases, at least when the goal of the jurisdiction‘s juvenile
justice system is rehabilitative rather than punitive, 195 but the court has not spelled out the
contours of that right. Without significant discussion as to the standards applied, the Seventh
Circuit held in Nelson v. Heyne that juveniles‘ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment was violated when they were beaten and involuntarily administered drugs,
but that their Fourteenth Amendment due process right was violated by the failure to provide
them with treatment.196 In contrast, the First Circuit has held that juveniles have no right to
rehabilitation, but that their conditions of confinement must be analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment.197
Whether under a Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment analysis, the standard for conditions
cases applied to juveniles should be appropriately tailored to their developmental status, and not
simply a reiteration of adult standards. To incorporate developmental status into the existing
structure for conditions claims, a juvenile deliberate indifference standard would require courts to
consider: (1) the seriousness of the harm in light of juvenile vulnerability; and (2) the intent of the
correctional official in light of the heightened duty to protect juveniles.
Assessing the Seriousness of the Harm in Juvenile Cases
In establishing a constitutional violation under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment,
courts must initially consider the seriousness of the harm. 198 In light of adolescent vulnerability,
conditions may rise to this level in the juvenile context even when they do not for adults. As
described in Section I of this Article, and recognized by the Supreme Court in both Roper and
Graham, juveniles are both more vulnerable to pressures and more malleable than adults. This
means that the effects of a harmful condition may take a unique toll on a juvenile, even when the
same punishment is constitutional for an adult. For example, such practices as isolation or stripsearching may inflict heightened trauma on youth. Similarly, the failure to provide education and
rehabilitation may be particularly harmful to a juvenile by depriving him or her of the opportunity
for age-appropriate growth and development. Indeed, even before Roper, courts recognized that
certain institutional conditions might be unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile even when they
fall within constitutional bounds for an adult. 199
(observing that juveniles have more need than adults for ―the guiding hand of counsel‖). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Court underscored that the Fourteenth rather than the Sixth Amendment governed the functioning of juvenile court. 403
U.S. 528, 543 (1976) (holding that juveniles are not entitled to trial by jury). Failing to distinguish between juvenile and
adult court, the Supreme Court explained, ―chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.‖ Id. at 550. In Schall v. Martin, the
Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to a challenge to juvenile pre-trial detention practices, emphasizing the
importance of the State‘s ―‗parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child‘‖ 467 U.S. 253,
263 (1984) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
195

Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432.

196

Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1974).

197

Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983).

198

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 878 (1994).

199

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372
(3d Cir. 2004) (remanding to the lower court). The Juvenile Law Center represented A.M. in this matter.
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Since Roper and Graham, this argument carries even more weight. Recently, the United
States District Court for New Jersey explicitly recognized that juvenile status may impact the
protections owed to incarcerated individuals, and that isolation of youth may be unconstitutional
even if it would be constitutional for adults. 200 This recognition of the unique harm to youth is
consistent with developmental research on adolescent vulnerability, specifically in the areas of
emotion regulation and independent functioning. 201 Harsh penalties imposed on juveniles are
likely to evoke a range of negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, distress) that adolescents cannot
effectively regulate, thereby leading to psychological distress and potentially psychopathology. 202
Further, this type of treatment could undermine adolescents‘ developing sense of self by evoking
a sense of powerlessness and challenging their bodily integrity. For youth who have experienced
trauma, the vulnerability is even further magnified. 203 Thus, the appropriate ―seriousness of the
harm‖ test for juveniles must account for the unique juvenile vulnerability to harm in
confinement.
Assessing Official Intent in Juvenile Cases
As described above, in adult cases the Court generally requires proof of the prison
official‘s subjective intent to hold a prison condition unconstitutional: a finding that the prison
official knew of or consciously disregarded an excessive risk of harm. Even under this standard,
liability should attach for juveniles when it would not for adults; it is not unreasonable to expect
that juvenile corrections staff understand—or are at least aware of—juveniles‘ unique
vulnerability to harm and that they act accordingly.204 Ultimately, however, the standard itself is
inapt for juvenile offenders—an objective standard that imposes liability when the prison official
disregards an obvious risk of harm better responds to adolescent developmental immaturity. 205
This heightened standard, whether the objective test or the heightened subjective test, is supported
by the Supreme Court‘s acknowledgement in Graham and Roper that the Constitution must
protect youth from harm even when it would not do so for adults. 206
This approach is further supported by the literature on developmental immaturity.
Adolescents‘ decision-making deficits, impulsivity, and overall vulnerability make them
dependent on adults for rational decisions regarding their welfare. More specifically, adolescents‘

200

Troy D. v. Mickens, No. 10-2092, 2011 WL 3793920, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2011). The court applied
the same theory to the right to counsel at a parole hearing, noting that it may be needed to protect juveniles from harsh
conditions. Id. at *8. The Juvenile Law Center currently represents Troy D., along with co-counsel Dechert LLP.
201

See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 49, at 745.

202

Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviors and
Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 542, 554 (2002).
203

For a broad discussion of the role of trauma in juvenile vulnerability, see SANDRA BLOOM, CREATING
SANCTUARY: TOWARDS THE EVOLUTION OF SANE SOCIETIES 25–33 (1997).
204

While neither the Troy D. nor A.M. cases mentioned above, supra note 199–200, explicitly address this
point, the issues they raise about treating juveniles differently from adults support such an interpretation.
205
This test has been applied outside the prison context in Fourteenth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Kennedy
v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005);
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418,
427–28 (3rd Cir. 2006) (recognizing that an objective deliberate indifference standard might apply under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
206

See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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limited independent functioning and weak self-concept suggests that they may be less able to
identify risks to their development and to protect themselves. 207 A heightened standard would
appropriately protect youth from the risk of treatment that could harm youth and interfere with
their development into healthy adults. For youth in the juvenile rather than criminal justice
system, the explicit purposes of treatment and rehabilitation further support the heightened
standard. To hold staff liable only if they consciously disregard a risk undermines the
requirement implicit in a rehabilitative system that staff proactively engage youth.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORTS DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that international law informs the
domestic law of the United States.208 Specifically, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to
international law and practice to interpret the broad language of the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel
and unusual punishment clause. In 1958, the Court held that the Amendment ―must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖ 209
and went on to analyze the opinions of the ―civilized nations of the world.‖ 210 Since then, the
Court has repeatedly found relevant to its Eighth Amendment analyses the laws, practices, and
opinions of the world‘s countries, as well as the evolving attitudes of the global community as
evidenced by international treaties and conventions. 211
Recently, the impact of international law on the Court‘s opinions has been particularly
evident in its death penalty and juvenile sentencing cases. In holding that the death penalty was
unconstitutional for those with mental disabilities, the Court noted that, ―within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.‖212 Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court
held the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles. To support its holding, the Court cited to the
United Nation‘s Convention on the Rights of the Child (which is ratified by every nation in the

207

See Kemp et al., supra note 45.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (―[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination‖).
208

209

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

210

Id. at 102.

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (―[o]ther nations, too, have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.‖);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (―within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.‖); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830–31 (1988) (―[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was
less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected
professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the
Western European community.‖); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (―the doctrine of felony murder has
been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is
unknown in continental Europe.‖); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (―[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that
out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not
ensue.‖).
211

212

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.21.
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world except the United States and Somalia), other ―significant international covenants,‖ 213 and
the practices of specific countries as evidence of ―the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty.‖ 214 In the 2010 case Graham v. Florida, the Supreme
Court reiterated the importance of international practice when it used the fact that the United
States was the only nation to maintain the practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in
prison for non-homicide offences as support for declaring the practice unconstitutional. 215 In
2012, the Court will consider the constitutionality of imposing a life sentence without parole on
juveniles in a murder case. 216 International law and practice overwhelmingly oppose this practice,
which will prove instructive if the Court continues its recent trend of reliance on international
opinion.
A. International Law and Juvenile Sentencing
International law provides further support for a new look at other juvenile sentencing
issues. Regarding the sentencing of youth in general, the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
the oversight body of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, advocates for the proportionality
of any disposition ―not only to the circumstances and the gravity of the offense,‖ but also to ―the
age, lesser culpability, circumstances and needs of the child, as well as to the various and
particularly long-term needs of the society.‖217 The Committee also reemphasizes that the
detention or imprisonment of juveniles should only be used as a means of last resort. 218 Many of
the non-child-specific treaties also advocate for special protection of children in conflict with the
law throughout the judicial process.219
Further, many of the international treaties that the Supreme Court has relied on in the
past specifically prohibit the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on juveniles. In
addition to reminding states of the child‘s need for ―special safeguards and care including
appropriate legal protection,‖ the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly bans the
imposition of imprisonment without possibility of release for offenses committed by those under
eighteen.220 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), part of the
International Bill of Rights,221 recommends that governments consider age and desirability of
213

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).

214

Id. at 578.

215

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2011).

216

See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ORDERS IN PENDING CASES (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/110711zor.pdf (showing that Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011)
(No. 10-9647), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9646), have been granted certiorari and will be
heard by the United States Supreme Court). For a discussion of the facts of Miller and Jackson, see supra note 41.
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children‟s Rights in Juvenile
Justice, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CRC, General Comment 10].
217

218

Id. at ¶ 70.

219

See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, ¶ 4, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (specifying that procedures for juveniles
should take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation).
220
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
221

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohch.org/

english/law/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
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rehabilitation when sentencing juveniles, 222 and grants special protection to minors on account of
their age.223 The Human Rights Committee, the body responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the ICCPR, has stated in its observations of United States compliance with the
treaty that ―the committee is of the view that sentencing children to life sentence without parole is
of itself not in compliance with article 24(1) [the right to a child‘s measures of protection] of the
Covenant.‖224 International practice is equally disapproving of the practice. The United States is
the only nation in the world that currently imposes life without parole sentences on juveniles. 225
Even in countries where the laws allowing the practice remain on the books, these sentences are
not imposed.226
The United States also has a legal obligation to enforce international treaties it has
ratified that forbid harsh sentencing practices for youth. The Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution declares that treaties are ―the supreme Law of the Land,‖ 227 and by signing
international treaties, all courts of the United States are bound to give effect to them. 228 Even if
an international agreement is not self-executing and does not have the effect of law without
necessary implementation,229 the United States is still bound by international law to respect the
―object and purpose‖230 of the treaty, pending implementation. Thus, the United States is required
to respect the provisions of treaties it has signed, and their enforcement bodies‘ interpretations of
the treaties, with respect to life without parole sentences for juveniles. The United States has
ratified and must therefore honor the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),231 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),232
222

ICCPR, supra note 219, at art. 14.

223

Id. at art. 24.

224

Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec.
18, 2006).
225

Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and
Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 985 (2008).
226

Id. at 990.

227

U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.

228

Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 115(1)-(2) (1986).

229

Id. at § 111(3).

230

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (recognizing the VCLT as jus cogens, a fundamental norm from which no derogation is
permitted); Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (1986). The United States
considers ―many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international
law on the law of treaties.‖ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
See ICCPR, supra note 219, at art. 14, ¶ 4 (―In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such
as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.‖); Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1 (―Every child
shall have . . . the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor.‖). In signing the treaty, the
United States made significant reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including ―[t]hat
the United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that ‗cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment‘ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eights and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States‖; and ―[t]he United States reserves the right, in exceptional
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults.‖ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA‘S RESERVATIONS TO THE ICCPR, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvICCPR.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
The Human Rights Committee, the ICCPR‘s enforcement body, has stated that it views these reservations as
231
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and the Convention Against Torture (CAT),233 all of which support a prohibition against the use
of harsh sentences for juveniles.
The treaties‘ oversight bodies issue periodic reports on the United States‘ compliance
with the articles of the treaties. Like the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has stated that the persistence of the
sentencing of juveniles to life without parole is incompatible with the United States‘ obligations
under the CERD in light of the sentencing practice‘s disproportionate impact on youth of color. 234
The Committee Against Torture also stated that life imprisonment of children ―could constitute
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.‖ 235
International law and practice support sentences for juveniles that are proportional and
mindful of the child‘s need for special safeguards and care and explicitly prohibit the imposition
of life without parole sentences for juveniles.
B. International Law and Juvenile Conditions
Just as the Supreme Court has turned to international law in its decisions on questions of
sentencing, it can, and should, do so for questions of conditions of confinement. International law
underscores the unique protections confined juveniles need under the law. When contemplating
treatment or punishment, Article 37 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child requires that
every child deprived of his or her liberty ―be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his
or her age.‖236 Moreover, international treaties and conventions make clear that children must be

―incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.‖ Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America,
¶ 279, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter CCPR Concluding Observations/Comments]. Notably,
the United States also entered another reservation to the convention, which allowed the imposition of capital punishment
―on any person . . . including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.‖ ICCPR,
supra note 219, at art. 6, ¶ 5. According to the Committee, this reservation also violated the object and purpose of the
Covenant. CCPR Concluding Observations/Comments, at ¶ 281. The reservation was effectively voided by the Supreme
Court‘s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held that imposing the death penalty upon juveniles
under the age of eighteen violates the Eight Amendment.
232

See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2(c), opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (―Each State Party shall take
effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and
regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.‖); Id. at art. 5(a)
(―States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in . . . [t]he
right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.‖).
233

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 165 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
234
Comm. On the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/b (Feb. 2008).
235

Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of America, ¶ 34, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).
236

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37.
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treated differently than adults: the law specifically addresses children, 237 promotes the best
interest of children,238 and emphasizes the need to treat confined children differently from adults
due to their age and future potential for rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 239 Notably,
the United Nations Rules for Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (JDLs), passed by resolution of
the U.N. General Assembly in 1990, establish detailed ―minimum standards‖ 240 for the protection
of confined juveniles ―with a view to counteracting the detrimental effects of all types of
detention and to fostering integration in society.‖ 241 These standards provide a good conceptual
framework through which to view the special requirements necessary for juveniles in detention.
International law standards also provide insights into some of the specific conditions youth face in
confinement.
International law establishes that youth should be separated from adults and should be
housed in conditions that best meet their needs. Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) explicitly requires that ―every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from
adults unless it is considered in the child‘s best interest not to do so,‖ an obligation echoed
throughout child-specific human rights instruments. 242 General Comment Number 10, issued by
the Convention on the Rights of the Child‘s oversight body, the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, further elaborated on the language of the Convention, stating that children who turn
eighteen do not have to be immediately moved to an adult facility and should be allowed to
remain in a children‘s facility if it serves the child‘s best interest. 243 Moreover, the JDLs provide
a general guideline that reemphasizes the protection of children: ―[t]he principle criterion for the
separation of the different categories of juveniles . . . should be the provision of the best type of
care best suited to the particular needs of the individuals concerned and the protection of their
physical, mental and moral integrity and well-being.‖244
In contemplating the environment of the confined juvenile, international human rights
conventions focus on the rehabilitative and developmental aims of detention. For example, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child requires that children are provided with ―a physical
environment and accommodations which are in keeping with the rehabilitative aims of residential
placement.‖245 The Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirms the child‘s right to privacy
for children who are alleged or accused to have infringed the penal law. 246 The JDLs stress that
237

This analysis focuses on: the CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, issued by the Committee on
the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (JDLs), G.A.
Res. 45/113, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49/Annex (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter
JDLs]; and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules),
G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter ―The
Beijing Rules‖].
238

See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 3.

239

See, e.g., JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 3; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 85.

240

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 3.

241

Id.

242

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37; see also JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 29
(―In all detention facilities juveniles should be separated from adults, unless they are members of the same family.‖); The
Beijing Rules, supra note 237, at ¶ 26.3 (―Juveniles in institutions shall be kept separate from adults . . . ―).
243

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, ¶ 86.

244

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 28.

245

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89.

246

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 40(2)(vii).
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the ―possession of personal effects is a basic element of the right to privacy and [is] essential to
the psychological well-being of the juvenile.‖247
International law also requires medical and mental health treatment for juveniles to
support their reintegration into society. In addition to general provisions that guarantee access to
adequate medical care for juveniles upon admission to facilities and throughout their stay, 248 the
JDLs specify that juveniles must receive both preventative and remedial care, as well as the
medical services required to ―detect and . . . treat any physical or mental illness, substance abuse
or other condition that may hinder the integration of the juvenile into society.‖ 249
The importance of family contact for confined juveniles is also explicitly recognized in
international law. Article 37 establishes the child‘s ―right to maintain contact with his or her
family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.‖ 250 The Committee
on the Rights of the Child specifies ―[e]xceptional circumstances that may limit this contact [with
the family] should be clearly described in the law and not be left to the discretion of the
competent authorities.‖251 The JDLs require that detention facilities for juveniles be decentralized
and be an appropriate size to facilitate access and contact between the juveniles and their families,
at least once a week, but not less than once a month, because communication is ―an integral part
of the right to fair and humane treatment and is essential to the preparation of juveniles for their
return to society.‖252
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is very specific on the use of restraints or
force for juveniles. Restraint or force may only be used when the child poses an imminent threat
of injury to him or herself or others, 253 when all other means have been exhausted, 254 and under
close and direct control of a medical and/or psychological professional. 255 Restraints or force may
never be used as a means of punishment. 256 The Committee on the Rights of the Child specifies
that corporal punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement, or ―any other
punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health or well-being of the child
concerned‖ are strictly forbidden under Article 37.257
One of the few standards specifically addressing safety issues for staff states that ―[t]he
carrying and use of weapons by personnel should be prohibited in any facility where juveniles are
detained.‖258 This area is less developed in child-specific international human rights instruments,

247

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 35.

248

See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 25 (recognizing the right of a child to
―treatment of his or her physical or mental health‖); CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89 (providing that
every child ―shall receive adequate medical care throughout his/her stay in the facility . . .‖).
249

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 51.

250

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37.

251

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 87.

252

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶¶ 58–60.

253

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 87; see also JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶¶ 65–67
(prohibiting all disciplinary measures that constitute ―cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . including corporal
punishment‖).
254

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89.

255

Id.

256

Id.

257

Id.

258

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 65.
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which tend to focus on the interests of the child, but an underlying theme seems to be that the best
interests of the confined child carry particular weight. When many children are housed together,
their interests should be balanced against the best interests of other youth.For example, children
should be kept in a juvenile facility past the age of eighteen if such a decision is ―not contrary to
the best interests of the younger children in the facility.‖ 259 Likewise, the use of restraint or force
on a juvenile is only justified when the child poses an imminent threat to him or herself or
others.260 Consideration of the child‘s inherent dignity and the special needs of his or her age are
always relevant.261
Human rights instruments place great importance on ensuring that institutional staff is
aware of the special condition of juveniles. They require staff to know about relevant national
and international legal standards related to the juvenile‘s confinement, including the causes of
juvenile delinquency, adolescent development information, and strategies for dealing with
children in conflict without having to resort to judicial proceedings. 262 The JDLs specify that
personnel should attend ―courses of in-service training, to be organized at suitable intervals
throughout their career.‖263 The Beijing Rules also emphasize that there is a ―necessary
professional competence‖ when ―dealing with juvenile cases,‖ which should be established and
maintained.264
Human rights instruments extend beyond protecting children from harm; they also
address the child‘s rehabilitative needs. Indeed, they recognize education for every child of
compulsory school age as critical to the child‘s development and eventual return to society after
release.265 Education should be suited to the individual child‘s needs and abilities, and he or she
should also be given vocational training in occupations that are likely to prepare him or her for
future employment.266 The JDLs go further by stating that education for children in detention
should be integrated with the education system of the country so that reintegration is simpler after
release.267 The JDLs also specify that juveniles should be given the opportunity to perform
remunerated labor.268 Additionally, juveniles with learning difficulties have a right to a special
education.269 The instruments also specify that the juveniles have the right to a suitable amount of
time for exercise and appropriate recreation.270
International human rights standards provide clear support for a unique Eighth
Amendment juvenile standard in conditions of confinement cases. By highlighting the need for
reintegration, rehabilitation, and the support of human dignity, and by articulating juveniles‘

259

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 86.

260

Id. at ¶ 89.

See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 220, at art. 37 (stating that ―[e]very child deprived
of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age.‖).
261

262

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 97.

263

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 85.

264

The Beijing Rules, supra note 237, at Rule 22.1.

265

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 38; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89.

266

CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89.

267

JDLs, supra note 237, at ¶ 38.

268

Id. at ¶ 45.

269

Id. at ¶ 38.

270

Id. at ¶ 47; CRC, General Comment 10, supra note 217, at ¶ 89.
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unique needs as they relate to conditions of confinement, international law clarifies the need for a
more protective Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juveniles.
IV. CONCLUSION
Kids are different. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in J.D.B v North Carolina, a child‘s age
―is a fact ‗that generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.‘‖ 271 Noting
the long history of legal distinctions between children and adults, Justice Sotomayor further
observed: ―Like this Court‘s own generalizations, the legal disqualifications placed on children as
a class . . . exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are
universal.‖272 How we sentence and punish children must yield to these differences. And while
the Court has historically taken note of juvenile status in a broad array of civil and criminal
contexts,273 the Court‘s most recent decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. chart a course for a
more pronounced doctrinal shift in our analysis of children‘s rights under the Constitution. The
most severe sentences for children have been struck down, but the banning of these sentences
raises larger questions about the constitutionality of any sentencing scheme that fails to take
account of the commonsense differences between children and adults—differences confirmed by
research. ―The literature confirms what experience bears out.‖ 274
These differences also cannot be ignored when evaluating the conditions under which
children are incarcerated. While the Constitution may tolerate the solitary confinement of adult
inmates, for example, the isolation of children for weeks or months at a time recalls a Dickensian
nightmare, which offends our evolving standard of decency and human dignity. Children‘s
unique needs for educational services, physical and behavioral health services, and appropriate
interactions with nurturing caregivers to ensure their healthy development raise special
challenges—but also place special obligations on those responsible for their confinement. As
recent Supreme Court case law has shown, children warrant unique protections under the
Constitution. Both the sentences they receive, and the conditions under which they serve those
sentences, must be tailored to their developmental status.

271
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
674 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
272

Id. at 2403–04.

273

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

274

J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5.
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